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Abstract. A GNSS-based navigation system relies on 
externally received information via a space-based Radio 
Frequency (RF) link. This poses susceptibility to RF Inter-
ference (RFI) and may initiate failure states ranging from 
degraded navigation accuracy to a complete signal loss 
condition. To guarantee the integrity of the received GNSS 
signal, the receiver should either be able to function in the 
presence of RFI without generating misleading information 
(i.e., offering a navigation solution within an accuracy 
limit), or the receiver must detect RFI so that some other 
means could be used as a countermeasure in order to 
ensure robust and accurate navigation. Therefore, it is of 
utmost importance to identify an interference occurrence 
and not to confuse it with other signal conditions, for 
example, indoor or deep urban canyon, both of which have 
somewhat similar impact on the navigation performance. 
Hence, in this paper, the objective is to investigate the 
effect of interference on different GNSS receiver observa-
bles in two different environments: i. an interference sce-
nario with an inexpensive car jammer, and ii. an outdoor-
indoor scenario without any intentional interference. The 
investigated observables include the Automatic Gain Con-
trol (AGC) measurements, the digitized IF (Intermediate 
Frequency) signal levels, the Delay Locked Loop and the 
Phase Locked Loop discriminator variances, and the Car-
rier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) measurements. The be-
havioral pattern of these receiver observables is perceived 
in these two different scenarios in order to comprehend 
which of those observables would be able to separate 
an interference situation from an indoor scenario, since in 
both the cases, the resulting positioning accuracy and/or 
availability are affected somewhat similarly. A new Run-
ning Digital Sum (RDS) -based interference detection 
method is also proposed herein that can be used as 
an alternate to AGC-based interference detection. It is 
shown in this paper that it is not at all wise to consider cer-
tain receiver observables for interference detection (i.e., 
C/N0); rather it is beneficial to utilize certain specific 
observables, such as the RDS of raw digitized signal levels 
or the AGC-based observables that can uniquely identify 
a critical malicious interference occurrence.  
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1. Introduction 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) based po-
sitioning has an immense role in modern society. Reliable 
navigation is imperative in more and more applications 
nowadays on land, sea, and air. A major dependency on 
reliable localization has been emerging, especially within 
safety-critical applications [1]. GNSS signals, as well as 
many other Radio Frequency (RF) signals, are however 
extremely susceptible to unintentional and intentional ma-
licious interference. Since GNSS signals are also very 
weak, after travelling the distance of about 20000 km from 
the satellite to the Earth, they can be very difficult to re-
cover when subject to interference. 
Applications using GNSS based positioning for road 
tolling, insurance billing, or logistics have increased 
recently in quantity. Simultaneously, despite being illegal, 
intentional jamming of the related satellite navigation 
receivers has become temptingly easy. Though illegal, 
affordable jammer devices can easily be purchased online 
or built according to widely attainable online recipes. The 
increase in the amount of satellite navigation jammers is 
alarming, especially due to the serious damage they may 
cause. Because satellite positioning is in such a vital role in 
many applications, jammers may cause great damage if not 
detected and their effects mitigated. The typical usage 
environment of jammers is in cars, where they transmit 
a jamming signal usually on the civilian L1/E1-band where 
the accessible GPS C/A and the upcoming civilian Galileo 
codes are located. Civilian in-car jammers pose a severe 
threat to the trustworthiness of GNSS receivers [2]-[4]. 
High-power jammers may not only hinder the usage of 
GNSS in the vicinity of the jammer but also paralyze 
GNSS usage over a larger area. 
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The jamming signal may deteriorate the position so-
lution or totally induce loss of lock of GNSS signals de-
pending on the perceived Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) power 
ratio at the receiver [5], [6]. Different receivers react dif-
ferently to jamming depending on the properties of the 
jamming signal. The basic functionalities in most GNSS 
receivers are fairly similar, but the internal architecture and 
algorithms vary. Different kinds of filtering may for exam-
ple mitigate the effect of the jammer on the positioning 
accuracy and availability. Intentional GNSS jamming 
raises the noise floor and thus reduces the Carrier-to-Noise 
density ratio (C/N0) of the received signals. This effect is 
similar to the phenomenon perceived in the context of 
multipath propagation or general signal attenuation due to 
for example foliage: in such a case the received signals 
become weaker, also resulting in lower C/N0 measure-
ments. When the C/N0 is low enough, the receiver cannot 
anymore generate ranging measurements and the position 
solution cannot be computed. 
In order to mitigate the effects of interference from 
intentional or unintentional sources, reliable interference 
detection must be conducted first. In [7] and [8], interfer-
ence detection is performed based on a combination of 
several receiver observables, i.e., correlator output power, 
variance of correlator output power, carrier phase vacilla-
tion, and AGC (Automatic Gain Control) values. The 
studies reported in [8] are mainly based on simulated sig-
nals for different kinds of interference, for example, 
AWGN, Continuous Wave (CW), pulsed broadband, 
pulsed CW, etc. It is concluded in [8] that the correlator 
output power showed the best consistent performance un-
der varying level as well as varying sources of interference. 
The impact of various types of interference on AGC circuit 
is also studied in [9], [10], and it is concluded that the 
AGC can be used as an interference assessment tool for 
GNSS receivers.  
The objective of this research is to investigate the ef-
fect of inexpensive in-car jammers on different GNSS 
receiver observables. The investigated observables include 
the Automatic Gain Control (AGC) measurements, the 
digitized IF (Intermediate Frequency) signal levels, the 
Delay Locked Loop, the Phase Locked Loop discriminator 
variances, and the Carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) 
measurements. The reason for choosing these observables 
is motivated by the fact that all observables except AGC 
are instantly available at the signal processing stage, and 
can be utilized solely in a software-defined GNSS receiver. 
The software-defined receivers are useful tools for research 
purposes and are beneficial for testing and implementing 
various algorithms before hardware implementation. How-
ever, it is little bit tricky to obtain access to AGC observa-
bles, as the front-end manufacturers do not usually offer 
access to an AGC circuit. In this study, the AGC voltage 
test pin was used to measure the level of the gain control in 
the various scenarios. The selection of the observables 
assessed in this paper for interference detection is also in 
line with other previous studies on the topic mentioned in 
[7]-[9]. The behavioral pattern of these receiver observa-
bles is perceived in the presence of interference and in 
indoor signal condition without any intentional jamming. 
The authors also introduce a unique Running Digital Sum 
(RDS) based interference detection method for GNSS 
signals. In this method, the interference detection is per-
formed via a Running Digital Sum (RDS) [11], [12] check 
of the digitized signal after the Analog-to-Digital Conver-
sion (ADC) at the intermediate frequency. As shown later, 
the introduced RDS based interference detection method 
can successfully distinguish the intentional interference 
occurrence from that of a weak indoor signal condition. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 briefly characterizes the cheap car-jammer used 
in the experiment. In Section 3, all the considered receiver 
observables used for jamming detection are discussed. 
Experimental setup and result analysis are presented in 
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are made in Section 6 based on the experimental 
results.  
2. Jammer Characterization 
The increase in the amount of satellite navigation 
jammers is alarming due to the serious harm they may 
cause. The typical usage environment of jammers is in 
cars, where they act as so called personal privacy devices 
and transmit a jamming signal usually on the civilian 
L1/E1-band. A car jammer, the Covert GPS L1 jammer is 
used in the experiment. The Covert L1 jammer is shown in 
Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1.   Covert GPS L1 jammer. 
A constrained usage permission of the jammer was 
obtained from the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
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Authorities. According to the permission, the jammer has 
to be used within the laboratory of the Finnish Geodetic 
Institute (FGI) only for the purpose of research. The output 
power of the jammer was measured to be around +18 dBm, 
and it transmits chirp-like signals. A chirp signal (also 
known as sweep signal) is a signal in which the frequency 
increases ('up-chirp') or decreases ('down-chirp') with time. 
The Covert L1 jammer transmits a chirp signal with multi 
saw-tooth functions having a center frequency at approxi-
mately 1.577 GHz with a bandwidth of about 16.3 MHz. 
The power spectrum and the instantaneous frequency of 
the jammer are shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. The 
characteristics of Covert L1 jammer coincide very well 
with the findings reported in [2], [3]. 
 
Fig. 2.  Power spectrum of the Covert GPS L1 jammer. 
 
Fig. 3.  Instantaneous frequency of the Covert GPS L1 
jammer. 
3. Observables Used for Jammer 
Detection 
The following receiver observables are considered 
throughout the experiment for jamming detection: 
i) Carrier-to-Noise density ratio, 
ii) Running DLL variance,  
iii) Running PLL variance,  
iv) Automatic Gain Control level changing rate, and 
v) Running digital sum of the IF data samples. 
As mentioned earlier, the reason for choosing these 
observables is motivated by the fact that all observables 
except AGC are instantly available at the signal processing 
stage, and can be utilized solely in a software-defined 
GNSS receiver. A brief overview on each of these receiver 
observables is presented in what follows.  
3.1 Carrier-to-Noise Density Ratio  
Carrier-to-Noise density ratio (C/N0) is used to meas-
ure the strength of a received GNSS signal. The Carrier-to-
Noise density ratio (C/N0) estimation is performed based 
on the ratio of the signal’s wideband power to its narrow-
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where T is the code integration time in seconds (i.e., 
0.001 s for GPS L1 C/A signal); M is the total number of T 
blocks used for coherent integration (usually a fair choice 
of M = 20 is used as the data bit duration for GPS L1 C/A 
signal is 20 ms), and NPˆ  is the mean normalized power, as 
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where NP is the normalized power between narrow-band 
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where 
iP
I  and 
iP
Q  are the prompt correlation outputs at the 
tracking stage from the in-phase and quadrature arms, 
respectively. The values used in the experiments for M and 
K are 20 and 50, respectively. 
3.2 Running DLL Variance 
A non-coherent Early-Minus-Late (EML) discrimi-
nator is used in this particular experiment as the Delay 
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Lock Loop. According to [13], the EML discriminator can 
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where 
iE
I  and 
iE
Q  are the in-phase and quadrature correla-
tion outputs of the early correlators, respectively (i.e., 0.25 
chips early from the prompt correlation), 
iL
I  and 
iL
Q  are 
the in-phase and quadrature correlation outputs of the late 
correlators, respectively (i.e., 0.25 chips late from the 
prompt correlation). The DLL discriminator variance is 
then calculated from (6) for a running window of N = 1000 
points. 
3.3 Running PLL Variance 
A two-quadrant ‘ATAN’ Costas discriminator is used 
in this experiment as a Phase Locked Loop. According to 
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where 
iP
I  and 
iP
Q  are the prompt correlation outputs from 
the in-phase and quadrature arms, respectively. The Costas 
PLL discriminator variance is then computed from (7) for 
a running window of N = 1000 points. 
3.4 Automatic Gain Control 
Automatic Gain Control (AGC) is a key element in 
a GNSS receiver. The main responsibility of an AGC is to 
adjust the incoming signal power such that the quantization 
losses are kept as minimum as possible. Therefore, the 
AGC operation is usually directly coupled with the ADC. 
In case of a GNSS receiver, where the signal power re-
mains below that of the thermal noise floor, the AGC is 
mostly driven by the ambient noise environment rather 
than the signal power. As a result, AGC can be utilized as 
an important tool for assessing the operating environment 
of any GNSS receiver.   
Due to restrictions on emissions in and near the 
GNSS bands, it is quite likely that the AGC gain exclu-
sively depends on the ambient noise environment rather 
than the GNSS signal power, as is expected in a typical 
interference-free situation. However, in case of an unlikely 
presence of interference, the AGC gain drops sharply in 
response to increased power in the GNSS band. This sharp 
immediate change in the AGC gain pattern can be utilized 
to indicate an intentional interference occurrence, as shown 
in Fig. 7. A metric, termed as AGC level changing rate, is 
used in this experiment for jamming detection. The AGC 
level changing rate can be calculated as follows: 










i  (8) 
where xi is the measured AGC level at time ti.  
3.5 Running Digital Sum 
The GNSS signal Interference Detection is performed 
via a Digital Sum (DS) check of the digitized signal after 
analog-to-digital conversion at the intermediate frequency. 
The DS is a function that sums the digital levels of the 
received digitized signal after ADC. The Digital Sum (DS) 
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where ai is the digitized signal samples after ADC. For  
a 2-bit real quantization, ai can take any values from the set 
[±1; ±3]. Before calculating the digital sum, the bin distri-
bution of ai is converted from [±1; ±3] to [±1] as follows:  
 1;1  ii aa ,  (10) 
 1;1  ii aa . (11) 
This is done in order to make sure that all digital 
levels have similar contributions to the final digital sum 
count. An example DS count is shown in Fig. 4 in a normal 
jamming-free scenario and a jamming scenario, where the 
DS counts are 1.3% in a normal jamming-free scenario and 
10.8% in a jamming scenario with a maximum Jamming-
to-Signal (J/Smax) ratio of 25 dB. The example DS counts 
are obtained with a front-end module from Sparkfun Elec-
tronics, named as SiGe GN3S sampler v3 [14]. The DS 
counts of the digitized signal levels after ADC in a nominal 
jamming-free environment should always be as close as 
possible to zero. In other words, the quantized bin distri-
bution after ADC should be balanced such that there are  
 
Fig. 4.  Bin distribution of the digitized GNSS signal samples 
for 1 millisecond long data. 
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almost equal numbers of ‘+’ and ‘–’ levels in the digitized 
signal to avoid the presence of any DC bias in the signal. 
However, a small DC bias can always be present in a front-
end module, but in any case it should always be fixed to 
a certain number. For example, the DC bias for the used 
SiGe GN3S sampler v3 front-end is less than 2%.  
Finally, a Running DS (RDS) is calculated for 
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where a running window of N = 1000 is used in the 
experiment. 
4. Experimental Setup 
A software defined GNSS receiver platform, the FGI-
GSRx, is used to process the raw IF data samples in post-
mission. The FGI-GSRx has been developed for the analy-
sis and validation of novel algorithms for an optimized 
GNSS navigation performance. The FGI-GSRx develop-
ment was started from an open-source software radio plat-
form introduced in [15]. In this particular experiment, 
besides the DLL and the PLL implementation, the C/N0 
estimation technique and the proposed RDS based interfer-
ence detection method are implemented. A USB front-end 
module from Sparkfun Electronics, named as SiGe GN3S 
sampler v3 [14], is used to capture the raw GPS L1 C/A 
signal. The configuration of the SiGe radio front-end used 
in the experiment is mentioned in Tab. 1.  
 
Intermediate Frequency 4.092 MHz 
Front-end Bandwidth 2 MHz 
Sampling Frequency 16.368 MHz 
Number of Quantization bits 2 bits 
Tab. 1. Front-end configuration for SiGe GN3S sampler v3. 
Two different test scenarios are considered in the 
experiment: i. an intentional interference scenario with 
a maximum Jamming-to-Signal ratio (J/Smax) of 25 dB, and 
ii. an outdoor-indoor scenario without any intentional inter-
ference. The jamming-to-signal ratio, usually expressed in 
dB, is the ratio of the power of a jamming signal to that of 
a desired GNSS signal at a given point of a positioning 
receiver. The jammer signal was also constantly monitored 
with a spectrum analyzer during the test.  
Many RF front ends today have implemented an inte-
grated analog ADC and therefore it is almost impossible to 
read the settings and values from the AGC in the radio. 
Fortunately, for the purpose of calibrating the RF chain in 
a GNSS receiver, the RF often has a test pin for measuring 
the level of the AGC. This is intended to be used either 
with no RF input (or no signal) or with some predefined 
calibration signal. The SiGe RF front end that is used in the 
GN3S sampler also has such a calibration pin [16]. The 
datasheet describes the above mentioned two test 
procedures, where the calibration signal level was set to  
-88 dBm. According to the datasheet, the test point should 
provide an output voltage of 1.2 V when no signal is pre-
sent (maximum AGC gain) and 0.8 V when an L1 signal of 
-88 dBm is present at the RF input (minimum AGC gain). 
Unfortunately not much more information is available, but 
based on this and our measurements we have determined 
that when the noise level is increased the AGC voltage 
level is decreased.  
5. Result Analysis 
The impact of interference from the analyzed jammer 
on different GNSS receiver observables is shown in Figs. 4 
to 7. The Covert GPS L1 jammer was turned on after about 
56 seconds from the start of GNSS data capture with the 
SiGe front-end. The sudden drop in C/N0 values for all the 
tracked satellites at the 56th second is clearly visible in 
Fig. 5. The approximate J/Smax is measured by monitoring 
the spectrum analyzer. This is also evident from Fig. 5 that 
the loss of C/N0 due to jamming is at least 15 dB or more 
for all the tracked satellites. 
 
Fig. 5.  C/N0 for the tracked satellites in a jamming scenario 
with J/Smax = 25 dB. 
The running DLL variance and the running PLL vari-
ance for one of the tracked satellites (i.e., PRN 27) in the 
presence of interference are shown in Figs. 6 and 7, re-
spectively. The RDS of the digitized IF samples of the 
GNSS signal after ADC is also shown in Fig. 8. As shown 
in the figures, all these observables can successfully detect 
the interference occurrence almost immediately. The de-
tection thresholds in all the above cases are computed 
against a false alarm probability of 0.01. However, it takes 
about 1 second for each of these techniques to stabilize due 
to the coarse code and frequency estimation at the acquisi-
tion stage, and therefore, they can only offer a detection 
decision after that time period. The output from the AGC 
block of the SiGe front-end is measured at 1 Hz rate via 
a PC-based PicoScope oscilloscope [17] connected through 
an USB port. The sudden drop of AGC levels during 56 to 
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59 second is evident from Fig. 9. Due to the presence of 
jamming signal on the GPS L1 band, the AGC block reacts 
almost immediately by lowering down the AGC gain val-
ues to a minimal level. The AGC level changing rate is 
shown Fig. 10. In a nominal environment where the tem-
perature changes are steady, the only reason for such 
a huge drop in AGC is due to the presence of other un-
wanted RF signal in the GNSS spectrum. Therefore, the 
AGC level changing rate can be utilized to trigger any 
malicious interference occurrence by monitoring the AGC 
gain variations with respect to time.  
 
Fig. 6.  Running DLL variance in a jamming scenario with 
J/Smax = 25 dB. 
 
Fig. 7.  Running PLL variance in a jamming scenario with 
J/Smax = 25 dB. 
 
Fig. 8.  RDS of the digitized IF samples in a jamming scenario 
with J/Smax = 25 dB. 
 
Fig. 9.  AGC level in a jamming scenario with J/Smax = 25 dB. 
 
Fig. 10.  AGC level changing rate in a jamming scenario with 
J/Smax = 25 dB. 
The behavioral pattern of the analyzed receiver ob-
servables in a typical outdoor-indoor scenario are shown in 
Figs. 11 to 15. The tester was standing with the test equip- 
 
Fig. 11.  C/N0 for the tracked satellites in an outdoor-indoor 
scenario. 
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ment outside a typical three-story office building for about 
40 seconds, after which he started walking into the office 
entrance for another 40 seconds. During the following 10 
seconds (in between 80th and 90th seconds in the test), the 
tester was in the transition phase to walk from the outdoor 
to deep inside building made of concrete and steel, as can 
be seen from the sudden drop of C/N0 in Fig. 11.  
The running DLL variance and the running PLL vari-
ance of one of the tracked satellites (i.e., PRN 27) are 
shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively. It can be seen from 
these figures that both the variances increase due to the 
raise in the noise level, as the space-based GNSS signal 
faded away while moving towards indoor. The computed 
RDS of the digitized IF samples and the logged AGC level 
changing rate in this outdoor-indoor scenario are shown in 
Figs. 14 and 15, respectively. It can be seen from the fig-
ures that the computed RDS and the AGC gain is not at all 
affected by the increase in the noise level due to the signal 
fading while moving towards indoor.  
 
Fig. 12.  Running DLL variance in an outdoor-indoor scenario. 
 
Fig. 13.  Running PLL variance in an outdoor-indoor scenario. 
The above results demonstrate the fact that the inter-
ference detection should only be based on such receiver 
observables which get affected only by the presence of 
interference, not by any other error source like shadowing 
or weak signal condition. Hence, the most suitable receiver 
observables for interference detection are either the AGC 
output levels or the RDS count of the digitized signal lev-
els. However, it is not always trivial to get access to AGC 
output, as it resides in the RF chain within the ADC block. 
Fortunately, the digitized signal levels are the output from 
the ADC block, which are then utilized by the acquisition 
and tracking blocks for further receiver-specific process-
ing. While doing the receiver-specific processing, a simple 
RDS count on the digitized signal levels can be done to 
identify the presence of any malicious interference 
occurrence.  
 
Fig. 14.  RDS of the digitized IF samples in an outdoor-indoor 
scenario. 
 
Fig. 15.  AGC level changing rate in an outdoor-indoor scenario 
plotted on top of that of the jamming scenario 
presented in Fig. 10. 
6. Conclusions 
Five different receiver observables are investigated as 
candidate decision statistic for interference detection in two 
different environments: in the presence of intentional inter-
ference from an inexpensive car-jammer and in an outdoor-
indoor environment without any intentional interference. 
The behavior of these observables in the above conditions 
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and their ability to uniquely identify an interference occur-
rence were addressed. It was shown that three of the re-
ceiver observables, i.e., C/N0, running DLL variance, and 
running PLL variance, cannot really distinguish the inten-
tional interference occurrence from that of a weak signal 
condition as they react similarly in both the cases. It was 
also concluded that the proposed running digital sum of the 
digitized IF samples and the AGC output levels, can 
uniquely identify an intentional interference occurrence of 
a jammer as these observables do not get affected by the 
additive white Gaussian noise. The future work includes 
investigation of the proposed RDS based interference de-
tection method in the presence of different interference 
sources (i.e., continuous wave interference, pulsed interfer-
ence, etc.) with a variety of receiver front-ends from dif-
ferent manufacturers.  
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